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Abstruct 
Japanese social scientists were mobilised by the wartime government. Reform-minded 
intellectuals thought that the government should control the national and imperial economy 
and that social science could contribute to policy-making. Through their commitment to the 
government’s advisory groups and research projects, they tried to reform Japan’s 
diplomatic relations as well as domestic systems although most of their plans were 
politically defeated. I shall indicate the following four points for future discussion on 
Japan’s wartime and postwar social history of knowledge.This paper is a literature review 
for discussion on empire, mobilisation and intellectuals in wartime Japan. By combining 
hitherto fragmented studies of various transwar topics, this study highlights the following 
themes: 1. Politico-intellectual continuities in the “transwar” period. 2. The significance of 
“Empire without colonies” in the development of Japanese colonial studies and therefore 
also of postwar area studies. 3. The interconnection of concepts of Pan-Asianism and Anti-
Asianism (De-Asianisation) in the emergence of wartime and postwar Japanese economic 
and social thought. 4. The complex and interconnected influence of wartime ideology and 
postwar US Cold War ideology in shaping Asian studies in Japan. 
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Politico-intellectual Continuity in the Transwar Period 
How should we understand the place of the fifteen-year war (1931–1945) in the twentieth 
century history of Japan? As Victor Koschmann argues, “the approach to Japan’s modern 
history that predominated from the early-postwar period down to the early 1960s, and 
retained considerable influence even in the 1980s and beyond” emphasised the “premodern 
residue” in modern Japan to explain “the authoritarianism and expansionism that 
characterized Japan’s history between 1931 and 1945” through “a theory of premodern 
particularism” rather than “modern universalism”. According to this approach, “inasmuch 
as the reforms that followed Japan’s defeat were explicitly designed to eliminate premodern 
irrationality and to complete Japan’s domestic revolution, the postwar era tended to be 
sharply distinguished from wartime”. This historical perspective influenced by Marxist 
history formed the mainstream of Japanese historiography in the second half of the 
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twentieth century, although a revisionist view from the 1960s “sought to rehabilitate major 
aspects of the wartime order while also implicitly vindicating the postwar establishment as 
the culmination of a modern Japanese success story”. The dominant view regarded Japan’s 
wartime years as a “dark valley” which was a deviation from/between the democratic and 
internationalist interwar years and the normalised postwar years. 1  
Since the 1980s, one “new perspective that interprets ‘wartime’ as intimately 
connected to– and, indeed, the fundamental condition for–‘postwar’” emerged to analyse 
Japan’s wartime years as the origin of the total war (mobilisation) system. This approach, 
set out in Total War and ‘Modernization’ (edited by Yamanouchi Yasushi, Victor 
Koschmann and Narita Ryūichi), argues that “the ills of the postwar era are, first of all, 
predominantly modern rather than residually premodern; and second, that they result not 
primarily from Japanese peculiarities but rather from tendencies that are in greater or lesser 
degree common to all ‘advanced’ capitalist nations”.2 Yamanouchi, Koschmann and Narita 
develop this point through discussing the rationalistic aspect of the socio-economic system 
and discourse in wartime Japan. Koschman mentions the continuity of the 
“wartime/postwar era”, that is, from the 1930s to the 1970s.  
In recent decades, other scholars from Japan and the US have also discussed the 
continuity between wartime and postwar in Japan, especially the economic and social 
aspects. In the 1990s, “deregulation” became a magic word in Japan, and Japanese 
economists pointed out that Japan’s economic policies and institutions under strong 
regulation originated from the wartime years, the so-called “1940s system”.3 Chalmers 
Johnson’s classic work, MITI and the Japanese miracle (1982), focusing on the fifty-year 
history of Japan’s Ministry of  International Trade and Industry from 1925, argued that state 
industrial policy exerted a powerful influence over the private sector. Johnson found that 
economic bureaucrats played an important role in Japan’s “development state” from the 
wartime period onward, and that this was a major cause of the postwar economic growth.4 
Sheldon Garon also focuses on bureaucrats and ministries, especially “social bureaucrats” 
in the Ministry of Home Affairs, in his examination of the state-labour relations. Garon 
argues that the social bureaucrats, who had promoted “the liberal labor programs of the 
1920s”, “devised the statist program in response to the perceived failures of liberal labor 
policies after 1931” and that “several of the same elite bureaucrats again switched gears 
after World War II to advance” labour policies in the Allied occupation period.5 Both 
Johnson and Garon thus point out the continuity of Japan’s wartime and postwar 
bureaucracy in terms of the intervention of the state into the national economy and society.  
                                                          
1 Koschmann, J. Victor, “Introduction to the English Edition”, in Yasuhi Yamanouchi, J. Victor Koschmann 
and Ryūichi Narita (eds.), Total War and ‘Modernization’ (Ithaca: Cornel University, 1998), pp. xi–xii.   
2 Ibid., xii–xiii.  
3 Noguchi Yukio 野口悠紀夫, 1940 nen Taisei『1940年体制』 (東洋経済新報社:東京,1995). 
4 Johnson, Chalmers A., MITI and the Japanese miracle (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982). In her 
recent work, Janis Miura discusses Japan’s “wartime techno-fascism” through focusing on “reform 
bureaucrats” (Kakushin Kanryō) in economic ministries. See Miura, Janis, Planning for Empire (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 2011). 
5 Garon, Sheldon M., The state and labor in modern Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 
pp. 3 and 190. 
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Bai Gao’s Economic Ideology and Japanese Industrial Policy discusses the 
continuity of Japan’s economic principles from 1930 to 1965. Gao argues that the ideology 
of developmentalism (a nationalistic perspective, production orientation, strategic view of 
the economy, constraints on market competition and rejection of the profit principle), which 
“served to combat the Great Depression and sustain the total war from 1931 to 1945”, 
survived to become “the basic framework of Japanese industrial policy, facilitating 
economic growth and the development of modern economic institutions”. 6 In order to 
establish developmentalist Japan, economists were mobilised by the state in which the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry played the key role. Gao focuses on 
“economic ideology” to examine not only ministries and bureaucrats but also intellectuals, 
especially economists.  
In his recent works, Andrew Gordon uses the term “transwar”, which covers the 
decades from the 1920s through the 1960s, especially the 1930s, 40s and 50s. According to 
Gordon, “‘transwar’ gives way to ‘postwar’ Japan” in the decade of the 1960s and “key 
elements of a ‘high postwar’ order of the 1960s were improvised or crystallized in a series 
of responses to the rapid succession of depression, war and recovery”.7  
 
 
Empire without Colonies 
Analysing wartime Japan-Asia relations, Peter Duus presents the concepts “informal 
empire”, “wartime empire” and “imperialism without colonies”. Japan annexed Korea and 
Taiwan before World War I and attempted to expand its territory thereafter. However, after 
World War I the Japanese empire, like western empires, tried to take advantage of these 
new regions in a form other than outright colonisation, because the principle of the right of 
national self-determination of others made the acquisition of colonies difficult to legitimise. 
Duus has explained Japan’s policy and order after WWI using two concepts: “informal 
empire” and “imperialism without colonies”. For instance, he claims that until the 1930s, 
“Japanese imperialism in China was not ‘formal’ so much as ‘informal’, defined by its 
participation in the benefit of the unequal treaty system” and “the Japanese presence in 
China was far more important to the home country in economic terms than its control over 
the formal empire”.8 Japan as well as Britain, France, America and other western countries 
enjoyed the unequal treaty system and the doctrine of the Open Door in China. 
After WWI, the institutions of informal empire faced nationalist movements: 
boycotts, demonstrations and strikes against foreign business. The Japanese empire 
“reacted by attempting a deeper political penetration of China”, although “the other treaty 
powers seemed willing to opt for a loosening of the system, if not total withdrawal” in the 
                                                          
6 Gao, Bai, Economic Ideology and Japanese Industrial Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997). 
7 Gordon, Andrew, “Consumption, Leisure and the Middle Class in Transwar Japan”, Social Science Japan 
Journal, vol. 10, no. 1, April 2007,  pp. 2–3. 
8 Duus, Peter, “Introduction / Japan’s Informal Empire in China, 1895–1937: An Overview”, in Peter Duus, 
Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie, The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895–1937 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. xi–xiii. 
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face of China’s new nationalism. 9  The system of informal empire was insufficient to 
maintain Japan’s special interests (tokushu ken’eki), so Japan invaded the Chinese mainland. 
It was, however, impossible for Japan to control occupied territories as colonies because of 
the anti-imperialist tone of international society after WWI, which did not allow the 
expansion of the formal empire. “That no doubt was also the reason that the Chinese 
territory occupied by the Kwantung Army in 1931–32 was reorganized as an independent 
state, Manchukuo, rather than a formal colony or territory” under Japan’s direct control.10 
The Japanese empire used its military power to create collaborator states such as 
Manchukuo and the Wang Ching-wei regime. 
Japan pursued the military occupation of China in the 1930s and proposed the 
vision of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (GEACPS/Daitōa Kyōeiken) in the 
1940s. According to Duus, post-1918 Europe established new systems of domination that 
were justified by two principle methods: by the concept of the mandate and by the ideology 
of pan-nationalism.11 Duus suggests that the vision of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere was the “principal Japanese response to the intellectual dilemma of interwar 
imperialism” and a Japanese version of pan-nationalism.12 Although the GEACPS was 
vague and “a series of empty rhetorical gestures”, the vision mentioned “independence” for 
Southeast Asians areas occupied by Japan.13 Besides the GEACPS, Japanese intellectuals 
also discussed other “new orders” for a “post” imperialist era such as the Greater East Asia 
Conference and its Joint Declaration. 
While Duus analyses the GEACPS within the framework of “imperialism without 
colonies”, I wish to examine the ideas and activities of scholars of colonial policy in 
relation to intra-imperial relations/order by using the concept of “empire without colonies”. 
According to Michael Doyle, while imperialism is “simply the process or policy of 
establishing or maintaining an empire”, empire itself “is a relationship, formal or informal, 
in which one state controls the effective political sovereignty of another political society. It 
can be achieved by force, by political collaboration, by economic, social, or cultural 
dependence”.14 An empire, therefore, is created both by “annexation (formal sovereignty)” 
and “control (effective sovereignty)”.15 Louise Young  analyses the Japanese empire, by 
defining imperialism as process and empire as structure. “Imperialism is empire building; it 
represents the process of constructing a relationship of domination. Empire signifies what is 
built—the structures that produce and reproduce dominance”.16 Using the vision of the 
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and other ideas (regional or bloc formation and 
economic autarky), Japanese leaders and intellectuals discussed intra-imperial relationships 
                                                          
9 Ibid., p. xxv. 
10 Duus, Peter, “Imperialism Without Colonies: The Vision of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere”, 
Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol. 7, no. 1, March 1996, p. 58. 
11 Duus, Peter, “Imperialism Without Colonies: The Vision of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere”, 
Diplomacy & Statecraft, vol. 7, no. 1, March 1996, p. 54. 
12 Ibid., p. 58. 
13 Ibid., p. 69. 
14 Doyle, Michael W., Empires (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 45. 
15 Ibid., p. 32. 
16 Young, Louise, Japan’s Total Empire (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London :University of California Press, 
1998), p. 11.  
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and order (structure), that is, “empire” rather than the process of imperial expansion 
(imperialism). While I refer to Duus’s framework, I adopt the definition presented by Doyle 
and Young: Imperialism is a process whereas empire is a structure. What did wartime 
leaders and intellectuals seek to think and do in order to build an “empire without colonies” 
in transwar Asia?  
Prasenjit Duara presents the thought-provoking term “New Imperialism”, which 
was “exhibited in the foreign affairs of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan, 
rather than in those of the older European colonial powers”, through analysing the character 
of Manchukuo, while Duus considers the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere as an 
epoch-making idea for a new imperial order.17 It would be possible to reinterpret his “New 
Imperialism” as “new empire” through focusing on the structure of an empire. Duara’s idea, 
in a sense, is similar to Duus’s “imperialism without colonies”. As Duara argues, “while the 
new imperialists maintained ultimate control of their dependencies or clients through 
military subordination, they often created or maintained legally sovereign nation-states with 
political and economic structures that resembled their own” (for example, Manchukuo); 
“The new imperialists espoused anticolonial ideologies and emphasized cultural and 
ideological similarities” (for example, Pan-Asianism). In addition to these politico-cultural 
strategies (puppet states and pan-nationalism), Duara mentions the economic aspect of the 
“new imperialism” which “made considerable economic investments, even while exploiting 
these regions, and attended to the modernization of institutions and identities”. In other 
words, “the new imperialism occasionally entailed a separation of its economic and 
military-political dimensions. Although subordinate states were militarily dependent upon 
the metropole, it was not necessarily in the latter’s interest to have them economically or 
institutionally backward”.18   
Besides the above developmentalist character, Duara mentions another economic 
aspect of the new imperialism: its tendency “to form a regional or (geographically 
dispersed) bloc formation, promoting economic autarky as a means for the imperial power 
to gain global supremacy or advantage”. 19  Many intellectuals around the Konoe 
government were interested in the ideas of an autonomous bloc “influenced by models of 
autarky in Europe” and “[t]he bloc idea grew by the mid-1930s into the East Asian League 
(Tōa renmei) and the East Asian Community (Tōa kyōdōtai), and still later into the idea of 
the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere (Dai-Tōa Kyōeiken)”.20 Among these scholars 
were Konoe’s advisors Kada Tetsuji (a professor at Keio University) and Miki Kiyoshi (a 
Kyoto School philosopher). According to Kada, “the death/collapse of liberalist elements” 
was a corollary of “the age of wartime political economy”. Kada, who advocated “the 
solution of the Japan-China problem” from a “world wide” or “global perspective”, argued 
that “at the moment Japan need not imitate Euro-American imperialism in terms of national 
security. In fact, learning the way of Euro-American imperialism does not contribute to the 
                                                          
17 Duara, Prasenjit, “Nationalism, Imperialism, Federalism, and the Example of Manchukuo” Common 
Knowledge, vol. 12, no. 1, 2006, p. 48. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., p. 49. 
20 Duara, Prasenjit, Sovereignty and Authenticity (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003),  p. 62. 
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development of Japan but discourages the development of East Asia itself”, and he 
suggested the “scrapping of existing colonial or semi-colonial relationships”.21 Kada’s Tōa 
Kyōdōtai (East Asian Genossenschaft22) planned an Economic Cooperative Union based on 
the following points.23  
 
1. The Economic Cooperative Union is an economic relationship established in 
neighbouring areas.  
2. The aim of the establishment of the Economic Cooperative Union is not to build a 
relationship of exploitation through political means such as conquest but to found an 
associationist economy based on bilateral or mutual preference. 
3. Under the Economic Cooperative Union, therefore, individualism in capitalism and 
egoism in international relations are modified, and profit-oriented agency and national 
interest-centrism are reformed.  
4. This modification and reform are based on the well-organised plans for all 
members of the economic Genossenschaft.  In a Bloc economy, policies on multiple 
areas are based on providing benefits for the dominant country. In contrast, the 
Economic Cooperative Union considers not only the request of the central country. 
but also the demands of multiple areas as the central issue for policy-making even 
though one country has the central role in the Genossenschaft. In this sense, the 
Economic Cooperative Union is an institution in which each area has its own 
autonomy and cooperates with the other. 
5. In the above relationship the main aspects of trade, finance, investment, and 
economic development are under the control of the region-wide plan.  
 
Socio-economist Kada’s idea was to construct an associative unity of Japan-China-
Manchuria (Nichimanshi) based on the economic cooperative union. Focusing on the 
triangle of Japan, China and Manchukuo, he supported Japan’s Nanshin (Southern advance 
or Southern expansion) but paid little attention to Southeast Asia in the 1930s. In his book 
published in 1940, Kada advocated the Southern advance as a part of his East Asian policy, 
but his concrete idea was to expand Japan’s economic influence through trade, resource 
development and emigration to Southeast Asia, while the other intellectuals discussed paid 
more attention to European colonies in Asia.   
Duara extracts the essence of the new imperialism from the case of Japan’s control 
of Manchukuo, and considers Japan’s projects for autarky and an economic bloc, 
particularly Manchukuo, China and Japan (together with its colonies Korea and Taiwan). 
                                                          
21 Kada Tetsuji加田哲二, Tōa Kyōdōtai no Kōgai「東亜協同体論の梗概」, Zaisei Keizai Jihō『財政経済
時報』, July 1939, p. 15. 
22 Regarding the term Tōa Kyōdōtai, scholars translate the word into various English equivalents: Peter Duus, 
“East Asian Gemeinschaft”; Prasenjit Duara, “East Asian Community”; Tetsuo Najita and H. D. Harootunian, 
“East Asian Cooperative Union”. The idea of “Kyōdōtai” is based on association or cooperation. So I agree 
with Najita and Harootunian’s translation. And the German word “Gemeinschaft (society)” is not the 
equivalent of “Kyōdōtai”. “Genossenschaft” is a good equivalent instead. 
23 Kada Tetsuji加田哲二, Tōa Kyōdōtai no Kōgai「東亜協同体論の梗概」, Zaisei Keizai Jihō『財政経済
時報』, July 1939, pp. 16–17. 
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Economists, however, especially scholars in commercial colleges, discussed a wider 
economic sphere including Southeast Asia from the late 1930s. Among them were Kaneda 
Kinji (professor of colonial policy at the Kobe University of Commerce: now Kobe 
University) and Asaka Sueki (professor of colonial policy at the Osaka University of 
Commerce: now Osaka City University), who were leading figures in wartime colonial 
policy studies and activities such as the Great Japanese Association of Colonisation. 
The leading scholar of colonial policy Kaneda started to discuss Nanshin (Southern 
advance) and Nanyō (the South Seas or Southeast Asia) as an enlargement of Japan-China 
relations from 1938. His research paralleled the development of current issues such as the 
so-called “China problem”: wider war and nationalism in China. Kaneda claimed that “we 
have to think that the discussion on Nanshinron (Southern Expansion Doctrine) and the 
policy on the South (Nanpō Seisaku) have a close relationship with policy on mainland 
China and have become a part of a so-called broadly defined Renascent Asia Policy (Kōa 
Seisaku)” and “it is the overseas Chinese problem in Nanyō that clearly demonstrates this 
trend”. Kaneda examined how overseas Chinese, who “have physically and materially 
made significant contributions to the Chinese nationalist revolution” had been influenced 
by the worsening of Japan-China relations and concluded that “Japan has faced boycott 
movements against Japanese commodities led by Chinese overseas and not only have their 
protests become stronger but also their support for Chiang Kai-shek’s Chinese nationalist 
government has grown”. He concluded, “we have to recognise contemporary Japan-China 
relations are not just bilateral relations but are related on the big stage called Nanyō” (South 
Sea).24  
Asaka Sueki in Osaka was another important scholar in Japanese colonial policy 
studies, which was expanding its area of research from formal territories such as Korea and 
Taiwan to the so-called Nanpō, Southeast Asia. His question was what colonial policy 
could do “when it seems to be impossible to gain and govern new colonies by the 
imperialist way”.25 According to Asaka, after WWI “cosmopolitanism and internationalism 
resonated with democracy and liberalism, repudiated exclusive regionalism, and criticised 
great powers’ monopoly of territories” but “policies based on these doctrines did not go 
well at all” and a new type of nationalism had emerged “which was significantly different 
from imperialism-led nationalism”. 26  Asaka said, “in the coming era, the typical 
nationalism will be related to the regime which favours control-oriented domestic policy 
and organises to form a regional bloc. Therefore colonial policy is liberated from 
annexation-oriented policy”.27 In the new colonial policy, which was control-oriented and 
non-market based economic policy, “the element of colony is changing from a new territory 
to a member of a bloc sphere, from legal control to effective control, from legally absolute 
control to legally limited control, from conquest to collaboration, and from control to 
                                                          
24 Kaneda Kinji 金田近二, Nanshinron no Keizaiteki Kiso「南進論の経済的基礎」, Kakushin『革新』, 
August 1939, p. 37. 
25 Asaka Sueki浅香末起, Shokumin Seisaku no Shinkōsei「植民政策の新構成」, Gaikō Jihō『外交時
報』, 15 August 1940, p. 34. 
26 Ibid., p. 35. 
27 Ibid., p. 36–38. 
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leading. This trend is a universal and rational response to recent colonial problems”.28 
Kaneda also had a similar approach, and defined “Kōiki Keizai” (wider economy) as: 
a phenomenon in a process of equilibrium recovery derived from the recent collapse 
of liberal economy; a big economic formation, in which one strong national economy 
and neighbouring national economies combine to make a totally autonomous regional 
economy, and where members work together for co-existence and co-prosperity and 
make plans and controls by the collective will of economic defence in order to ensure 
political and economic independence from other regional economies.29   
 
Scholars who led economic policy studies and colonial policy studies from the late 1930s 
discussed the possible formation of such a wider economic sphere, including Southeast 
Asia, under an anti-liberalist administrative body controlling the entire economy. In order 
to create Japan’s “New Empire” in which “domination and exploitation coexisted with 
development and modernization”, intellectuals such as Kada, Kaneda and Asaka studied 
economic blocs and “the Manchukuo model of client-states was partially extended to 
regimes in occupied China and in Southeast Asia during the Pacific war”.30 Duara argues 
that the essence of Manchukuo “could be found after World War II in Eastern Europe, 
French Africa, the British sterling zone and the US empire”, that is, the Allies. 31 As 
Kobayashi Hideo argues in his works, Japan’s wartime enterprise in Manchukuo was taken 
over by postwar Japan re-entering Asia.32  
 
 
Pan-Asianism and De-Asiansation 
As Duus and Duara argue, the Japanese empire, by appropriating pan-nationalism, 
federalism or associationism and developmentalism, sought to rationalise and functionalise 
its structure through compromising with post-WWI norms that recognised national self-
determination and promoted state control of the economy. In the transwar years, 
intellectuals, especially economists, were mobilised for Japan’s imperial project to 
reorganise Japan-Asia relations. Yonetani Masafumi’s work on Japan-Asia intellectual 
relations provides a thought-provoking examination of the relationship between modernity 
and Orientalism in Japanese pro-Asia discourses.33 Many scholars have pointed out that 
Japan has historically had two types of discourses on Asia: Pan-Asianism and De-
Asianisation. In general, Asianism (Pan-Asianism or Pro-Asianism) was regarded as anti-
                                                          
28 Ibid., p. 42. 
29 Kaneda Kinji金田近二, Tōa Kōiki Keizai no Shomondai「東亜広域経済の諸問題」, Tōsei Keizai『統
制経済』, June 1941,  p. 3. 
30 Duara, Prasenjit, “Nationalism, Imperialism, Federalism, and the Example of manchukuo” Common 
Knowledge, vol. 12, no. 1, 2006,  pp. 50 and 65. 
31 Duara, Prasenjit, “The New Imperialism and the Post-Colonial Developmental State”, Japan Focus, 
http://japanfocus.org/-Prasenjit-Duara/1715 [accessed 08 August 2011]. 
32 Kobayashi Hideo小林英夫, Sengo Ajia to Nihon Kigyō『戦後アジアと日本企業』(東京: 岩波書店, 
2001) and Manshūkoku to Jimintō『満州国と自民党』(東京: 新潮社, 2005). 
33 Yonetani Masafumi米谷匡史, Ajia/Nihon『アジア／日本』(東京: 岩波書店、2006). 
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modern sentiment while De-Asianisation (Anti-Asianism) was seen as pro-Western 
modernism. The Genyōsha (Dark Ocean Society, founded in 1881) and its offshoot the 
Kokuryūkai (Black Dragon Society or Amur River Society, founded in 1901), the most 
well-known Pan-Asianist organisations in modern Japan, were considered ultra-
nationalistic and fanatical by the SCAP which dissolved them in 1946. The occupation 
authorities’ understanding was supported by historian E. H. Norman, who criticised these 
“patriotic societies” or “militarist-gangster organizations” as “a spearhead” for Japanese 
militarism.34  
One important discussant on the politico-intellectual relations between Japan and 
the rest of Asia was Chinese literature critic Takeuchi Yoshimi (1910–1977) who said 
“Japan's modern history was, in terms of ideas, progressing through a spiral of Datsua (脱
亜: leaving Asia) and Kōa (興亜: promoting Asia)”.35 In other words, “Japan’s course in 
Asia”, especially in the Meiji period (1868–1912), “is often seen as a conflict between 
Westernization-cum-imperialism (Japan devours Asia in concert with the Western powers) 
and a utopian Asianism (Japan unites Asia against the Western powers)”.36 The “Kōa” idea 
was originally Meiji era ideology, which promoted the solidarity of Asians in order to 
confront Western powers when all Asian countries but Japan were partly or fully-
colonised.37 Some regarded wartime Japan’s Asian policy, including the Greater East Asia 
Co-Prosperity Sphere, as a reversion toward Asianism (a return to Kōa after Datsua). On 
the other hand, the “Datsua” idea (De-Asianisation) was the opposite of the ideology of 
“Kōa”, which regarded “Asia” as an anti-Western unity. One of the well-known proponents 
of De-Asianisation was Fukuzawa Yukichi, who emphasised the dichotomy between 
“developing” Japan and “stagnant” Asia, and discussed Japan's modernisation without 
Asia.38 Fukuzawa argued, in his article “Datsua-ron (On Leaving Asia)”, “we are not able 
to wait for Asians until they are civilised in order to develop Asia.... we, in our mind, are 
getting out of the bad company in Asia”.39  
However, Yonetani Masafumi argues that both Kōa and Datsua were conceived on 
the basis of Orientalist and colonialist ideology.40 Fukuzawa had been an ideologue of Kōa 
ideas before writing the 1884 article on Datsua. Fukuzawa's major work on Kōa was 
written in an article of 1882 on Japan's relations with Korea.41 At the beginning of the 
                                                          
34 Norman, E. Herbert, “The Genyosha: A Study in the Origins of Japanese Imperialism”, Pacific Affairs, vol. 
17, no. 3, September 1944, p. 261.  
35 Takeuchi Yoshimi竹内好, Nihonjin no Ajiakan「日本人のアジア観」, Takeuchi Yoshimi Zenshū, vol. 5
『竹内好全集 第五巻』(東京: 筑摩書房 1981), p. 126. 
36 Zachmann, Urs Matthias, “Blowing Up a Double Portrait in Black and White”, Positions, vol.15, no.2, 
2007,  p. 345. 
37 Takeuchi Yoshimi竹内好, Nihonjin no Ajiakan「日本人のアジア観」, Takeuchi Yoshimi Zenshū, vol. 5
『竹内好全集 第五巻』(東京: 筑摩書房 1981), p. 121. 
38Yonetani Masafumi米谷匡史, Ajia/Nihon『アジア／日本』(東京: 岩波書店、2006) , p. 48. 
39 Fukuzawa Yukichi 福沢諭吉, Datsuaron「脱亜論」, in Keiō Gijuku (ed.) 慶応義塾編, Fukuzawa Yukichi 
Zenshū, vol. 10『福沢諭吉全集』10巻, (東京: 岩波書店, 1970), p. 240. 
40 Yonetani Masafumi米谷匡史, Ajia/Nihon『アジア／日本』(東京: 岩波書店、2006) , pp. 9–10. 
41 Fukuzawa Yukichi福沢諭吉, Chōsen no Kōsai wo Ronzu「朝鮮の交際を論ず」in Keiō Gijuku (ed.) 慶
応義塾編, Fukuzawa Yukichi Zenshū, vol. 8『福沢諭吉全集』8巻、 (東京: 岩波書店, 1960), pp. 28–31 
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article, Fukuzawa argued, “as compared to each other, Japan is strong and Korea is lesser. 
Japan has been civilised already and Korea is still primitive”. He believed Japan had to 
intervene in Korea and he supported Korean modernisers such as Kim Ok-gyun and Pak 
Yeong-hyo.42 Fukuzawa invited Korean modernisers to his school Keio Gijuku. Following 
the failed Gapsin Coup (Gapsinjeongbyeon) of 1884 (in which pro-Japan modernisers lost 
the political struggle against the pro-Chinese establishment), Korean activists including 
Kim Ok-gyun and Pak Yeong-Hyo lost power and Fukuzawa abandoned the Kōa idea and 
shifted to the approach expressed in his “Datsua-ron” of 1884. The Kōa idea was still 
strong, but Fukuzawa gave up his idea of Kōa due to his great disappointment with the 
Koreans after the Gapsin Coup. In fact, major Kōa (Pan-Asianist) organisations such as the 
Kōakai and the Genyōsha were established in the 1880s. 
Another important example of Kōa thought put forward after Fukuzawa published 
his Datsua-ron is Tarui Tokichi's “Daitō Gappō Ron” (大東合邦論) of 1893.43 Tarui, who 
was the founder of the banned “Oriental Socialist Party”, advocated that Japan and Korea 
should establish a federation called “Daitō Koku” (大東国: Great East), which would 
associate with Qing China to confront the Western powers. In his plan, although Japan 
would not colonise Korea, “poor” Korea would reach a civilised and developed state 
through the establishment of the federation, and the federation would eventually civilise 
Southeast Asia and the Pacific.44 Fukuzawa and Tarui, influential ideologues of the Kōa 
idea, argued that civilised Japan should facilitate the development of stagnant Asia. The 
Kōa idea, a typical form of Pro-Asianism, clearly involved Orientalist views that regarded 
Japan as a developed country dominating “stagnant Asia” based on the dichotomy between 
“civilised” and “savage”.45 Japanese modernisers were interested not only in westernising 
Japan, but also in civilising Asia. Japan's discourses on modernisation and Asianism were 
closely interlinked. 
Yonetani, while tracing the trend in Japanese thought that aimed to ally with Asian 
leaders through modernisation and civilisation, also emphasises the interaction between 
Japanese Pan-Asianists and Asian modernisers in modern Japan. Yonetani points out that 
Yoshino Sakuzō, a leading ideologue of “Taishō Democracy”, was not only an 
internationalist (Pro-Anglo Saxon) but also a Pro-Asianist, seeking to work with Korean 
and Chinese modernisers and to propose a restructuring of the Japanese empire in the 
interwar years. On the other hand, Japan’s traditional Asianism from the Meiji period was 
too naïve to collaborate with Asian leaders and intellectuals as an idea of solidarity for 
Asians after WWI. When anti-imperialist movements or anti-Japan demonstrations (such as 
the March First Movement in Korea and the May Fourth Movement in China in 1919) 
appeared, almost none of traditional Asianist societies could find a way to join hands with 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
(original text was in Jiji Shinpō『時事新報』, 11 March 1882). 
42 Yonetani Masafumi米谷匡史, Ajia/Nihon『アジア／日本』(東京: 岩波書店、2006) , p. 48. 
43 Ibid., p. 10. 
44 Tarui Tōkichi 樽井藤吉, Daitō Gappō Ron「大東合邦論」in Takeuchi Yoshimi (ed.) 竹内好編, Ajia 
Shugi『アジア主義』（現代日本思想体系 9）(東京:筑摩書房、1963), pp. 117 and 129. 
45 Yonetani Masafumi米谷匡史, Ajia/Nihon『アジア／日本』(東京: 岩波書店、2006) , p. 12. 
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Asian nationalists.46 In place of the traditional Pro-Asia activists including the Genyōsha 
leaders, Taishō modernisers such as Yoshino Sakuzō were emerging in intellectual and 
political discussions on Japan-Asia relations. They advocated not only the democratisation 
of politics and the development of social welfare in Japan’s domestic sphere, but also the 
promotion of political rights and the development of the economic situation in the colonies. 
As we shall see, Japanese modernisers and reformers who inherited the ideas of Taishō Pro-
Asian modernisers were committed to the reconstruction of Japan-Asia relations from the 
1930s. 
The interaction between Japanese Pan-Asianists and Asian modernisers, and 
nationalists in colonised societies cannot be ignored. We should notice the interaction 
between Japanese “orientalists”, and Asian “orientalists” both of who tried to modernise 
their societies. As I mentioned, Fukuzawa had interacted with modernisers of late 
nineteenth century Korea. Scholars, however, have generally ignored native “orientalists” 
in “orientalised” societies, while focusing instead on orientalists and orientalist discourses 
in the West and the imperial centres. What was happening to Japan's discourse on Datsua 
and Kōa in the wartime years and how did Japanese modernisers intervene in other parts of 
Asia during this period? How did these Japanese modernisers interact with other Asians 
elites who sought to develop and modernise their societies? Colonial policy studies and 
economic policy studies in the wartime years, as well as Asian studies in the postwar era, 
were moulded and mobilised on the home front through the process of interaction with 
intellectuals and nationalist activities in other Asian countries. 
 
 
Japan’s Asian Studies and Critique of Area Studies  
Edward Said’s Orientalism (1975) provoked reflective studies of the ideology of area 
studies in the West in the Cold War and postcolonial era. Asian studies and Japanese 
studies in the US have been the subject of debate by critical scholars including Harry 
Harootunian and Naoki Sakai.47 Many scholars understand that area studies in the US 
“originated in the immediate post-World War II era and sought to meet the necessity of 
gathering and providing information about the enemy. Later, the investigation was extended 
to any region of the world considered vital to the interests of the United States in the Cold 
War”.48 Area studies programs in American universities (such as Soviet studies and Asian 
studies courses) are often regarded as a product of the Cold War policy in the US, although 
WWII also promoted studies of “enemies” including Japan. Most critical discussions, 
which expose the geopolitical character of area studies, have focused on discourse and 
ideology, while they only briefly mention that area studies programs in the US relied on 
domestic and external funding including the Rockefeller Foundation and the Social Science 
                                                          
46 Marukawa Tetsushi丸川哲史, Nicchū Hyakunenshi『日中一〇〇年史』(東京: 光文社, 2006), p. 75. 
47 Harootunian, Harry and Sakai, Naoki, “Japanese Studies and Cultural Studies”, Positions, vol. 7, no. 2, 
1999. 
48 Harootunian, H. D. and Miyoshi, Masao, “Introduction: The ‘Afterlife’ of Area Studies”, in Masao Miyoshi 
and Harry Harootunian (ed.), Learning Places (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2002), p. 2. 
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Research Council, as well as foreign government sponsorship including support from Japan 
and South Korea.49 
Scholars examining modern Japanese scholarship on Asia have focused primarily 
on Sinology. Stefan Tanaka in his analysis of Japan’s Tōyōshi (Oriental History) finds a 
correlation between Japan’s construction of its Orient and Japanese imperialism.50 Joshua 
Fogel examines Japan’s Sinology in the works of Naitō Konan (1866–1934) and the 
intellectual interaction between Japan and China in the works of Nakae Ushikichi (1889–
1942).51 These and other research, including Yamamuro Shin’ichi’s encyclopedic work 
Shisō Kadai Toshiteno Ajia (Asia as A Intellectual Problem), mainly examine the 
intellectual relationship between Japan and China and discuss the era around the end of the 
nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century.52 By contrast, there has been little 
research on Japan’s knowledge of Southeast Asia and on wartime and postwar Asian 
studies. So far, therefore, little attention has been paid to the way in which Japan’s 
knowledge on Asia was transformed by imperial projects which combined responses to 
colonial nationalism and opposition to politico-economic liberalism.  
In Japan, wartime knowledge of Asia and postwar Asian studies had a very close 
connection. Both were not originally “enemy” studies like Japanese studies or Soviet 
studies in the US, but academic fields covering Japan’s political or economic subordinates 
and later potential markets or economic partners. In this sense, transwar social science on 
Asia was similar to early modern Sinology in Japan. On the other hand, both wartime and 
postwar Asian studies in Japan were close to national policy. In this respect they resembled 
the Asian studies of the US rather than Japan’s Sinology. Japan thus already possessed 
intellectually and institutionally indigenous area studies based on the imperial legacy, 
although Japanese social sciences and humanities including Asian studies was academically 
influenced and received financial support from the anti-communist US in the Cold War era.  
 
 
Relationship to Previous Studies of Japanese Economic Thought 
Japan’s economics and economists have been an important topic in Japanese studies.53 One 
recent work is Laura Hein’s Reasonable Men Powerful Words, which traces the activities 
and thought of an economic intellectual group that graduated from the Imperial University 
of Tokyo. The Social Sciences in Modern Japan by Andrew Barshey also deals with social 
scientists, especially “two of the most powerful streams”, Marxism and Modernism, 
focusing on Marxist economic scholar Uno Kōzō, Modernist political scholar Maruyama 
Masao and economic historian Ōtsuka Hisao, all of whom were professors at the (Imperial) 
                                                          
49 There are a few exceptions including Chomsky, Noam et al., The Cold War & the University (New York: 
New Press, 1997). 
50 Tanaka, Stephan, Japan’s Orient (Berkley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1993).  
51 Fogel, A. Joshua, Politics and Sinology (Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 
1984) and Nakae Ushikichi in China (Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1989). 
52 Yamamuro Shinichi山室信一, Shisō Kadai to shiteno Ajia『思想課題としてのアジア』 (東京:岩波
書店, 2001). 
53 Morris-Suzuki, Tessa, A History of Japanese Economic Thought (London and New York: Routledge, 1989). 
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University of Tokyo. Susan Townsend’s Yanaihara Tadao and Japanese Colonial Policy 
also focuses on intellectuals of the (Imperial) University of Tokyo.54 
Hein argues that “as in all modern societies, social scientists formed a new 
technocratic elite that approached problems in a new way and claimed authority through a 
new kind of expertise” to change “the nature of public debate”. She also points out an 
academic circle “fully participated in all rituals of meritocratic elite inclusion” such as “the 
mechanism of personal introduction” and “the etiquette of reciprocal obligations” based on 
personal connections including “school friendship” and “hometown and regional ties” as in 
all Japanese social groups (e.g. business, politics, bureaucrats and military).55  
However, the English language works above all focus on intellectuals based at the 
Imperial University of Tokyo. One reason is simply that the (Imperial) University of Tokyo 
was/is the most prestigious educational institute with the most influential scholars in Japan. 
Intellectuals (as well as political leaders such as communists) who did not support wartime 
governments had ethical authority as non-conformists or non-converts in the postwar 
society, while supporters or collaborators with wartime governments or government leaders 
were (whether fairly or otherwise) criticised for their record. The Ōuchi group (studied by 
Hein), Yanaihara (studied by Townsend) and Uno (studied by Barshey) were all expelled 
from their universities due to their Marxist tendencies or criticism of the government. 
Maruyama and Ōtsuka, early career researchers at that time, did not openly support any 
wartime government (but managed to retain their academic positions). 56  The Imperial 
University had contained some war regime ideologues or fanatics who left the university 
after the war. The renamed University of Tokyo in the postwar years reinstated previously 
ostracised social scientists who had played important roles in Japanese academia and 
intellectual life before 1945, and retained its intellectual authority and moral responsibility 
with reunited wartime non-conformists.          
Yet the Imperial University of Tokyo and its scholars are only part of the cases of 
wartime mobilisation and “wartime reform”. The wartime years of the Imperial University, 
especially the economics faculty, were chaotic due to the professors’ factionalism and 
government suppression, and for many scholars these years have been thought of as a black 
hole in research.57 It is difficult to analyse the relationship between interwar and wartime 
economists and/or between wartime and postwar economists in the (Imperial) University of 
Tokyo. In the Law Faculty (which contained important advisors to wartime Prime Minister 
Konoe Fumimaro), Rōyama Masamichi resigned from his professorship with his expelled 
friend Kawai Eijirō in 1939 (to join the Parliament in 1942) and did not return to the 
university although he continued his academic activities in other institutions in the postwar 
years. Yabe Teiji, another wartime policy advisor to Konoe, left the Imperial University at 
                                                          
54 Townsend, Susan C., Yanaihara Tadao and Japanese Colonial Policy (Richmond: Cuzon, 2000).   
55 Hein, Laura, Reasonable Men, Powerful Words (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), pp. 2, 16 and 17. 
56 Nakano Toshio argues the wartime discourse of Maruyama and Ōtsuka had an affinity with the wartime 
mobilization system. See Nakano Toshi 中野敏男, Ōtsuka Hisao to Maruyama Masao『大塚久雄と丸山真
男』(東京: 青土社, 2001). 
57 Takeuchi Yō 竹内洋, Daigaku to iu Yamai『大学という病』(東京: 中央公論新社, 2001). 
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the end of war although he was still a leading policy intellectual in postwar Japan. On the 
other hand, economic faculties in other universities such as Keio and Hitotsubashi (Tokyo 
College of Commerce) were not plagued by such strong factionalism and were much less 
chaotic. They also, however, played an important role in providing advice to the 
government both during and after the war. For example, Hitotubashi professors Itagaki 
Yoichi and Akamatsu Kaname worked for the Army’s wartime research project in 
Southeast Asia and became external advisors to the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the postwar years. In order to analyse how 
these intellectuals were related to the emergence of Japanese imperial order and postwar 
Japan-Asia politico-economic relations, it is more appropriate to focus outside the 
(Imperial) University of Tokyo.   
Wartime non-Marxist and non-mathematical economics has attracted little 
attention from Japanese scholars. In his book published in 1971, Tamanoi Yoshirō traced 
Japan’s economics in the pre-war era (including wartime years) on the following lines: “the 
introduction and assimilation of Socialist thought” including the idea of social policy and 
German social democracy, “the establishment of Marxist economics” and “the growth of 
Modern economics (Kindai Keizaigaku)”.58 His understanding, which described the history 
of Japanese economics in terms of the dichotomy of Marxian and neo-classical economics, 
has been followed by many scholars. Based on this historical approach, scholars have 
shown little interest in Itagaki Yoichi, who was neither Marxist nor neo-classical economist, 
nor in the group of economists around him (so-called wartime Seiji Keizaigaku: political 
economics), although many wartime social scientists took notice of their works. Many of 
the above economists, including Itagaki, led postwar “democratic socialism” which was 
anti-communist socialism.  
Hayasaka Tadashi was one of the first people to discuss wartime political 
economics including Itagaki. He categorised Japan’s wartime economics into three strands: 
Marxist economics, theory-oriented economics (Junsui Keizaigaku), and political 
economics (Seiji Keizaigaku). Hayasaka pointed out that not only Marxist and but also 
political economics had criticised general equilibrium theory, which was studied by theory-
oriented economists in the early 1930s. While the first two streams, known as Marxist 
economics and Modern economics today, became dominant trends in the postwar years, the 
third stream was treated with scant as regard by the postwar economics. In fact, leading 
wartime scholars of political economics (such as Naniwada Haruo) who proposed the 
establishment of “Imperial Way Economics (Kōdō Keizaigaku)” or “Japan Economics 
(Nippon Keizaigaku)” were branded as fanatic ideologues of the military regime and had to 
leave universities after WWII. However, Hayasaka argued that discussions of political 
economics, which was “a product not only of nationalist tendency but also of critics against 
existing economics”, still had implications for contemporary economic issues.59  
                                                          
58 Tamanoi Yoshirō 玉野井芳郎, Nihon no Keizaigaku『日本の経済学』(東京: 中央公論社, 1971). 
59 Hayasaka Tadashi 早坂忠, Junsui Keizaigaku ni taisuru Shohihan「純粋経済学にたいする諸批判」
（日本経済学史の諸断面（10））, Keizai Semina『経済セミナー』, no. 204, July 1972, p. 119. 
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In recent years, wartime economics has attracted Japanese scholars’ interest. 
Kamikubo Satoshi introduces “non-Marxist economics” of the first half of the twentieth 
century in his Who’s Who-style book.60  Yanagisawa Osamu examines how the economic 
ideas and systems of German Nazism were introduced and accepted by Japanese social 
scientists (such as Kada Tetsuji, Ōtsuka Hisao and Ōkōchi Kazuo) in the 1930s and 1940s. 
Yanagisawa, who takes a Marxian approach to understanding the transformation of the 
global economic system and Japanese capitalism between the 1920s and 40s, argues the 
characteristic of Nazidom as anti-laissez-faire and anti-economic liberalism was appealing 
to Japanese intellectuals who sought to transform capitalism after the Great Depression.61 
Makino Kuniaki examines “the activities and discourses of economists who faced ‘total 
war’ during WWI and WWII”, and argues that “it was the economy which played the 
important role in the total war, and economists were inevitably dragged into the total war 
mobilisation system”.62  
In this paper, I indicate periodical and geographical bridges as a perspectives for 
discussion on colonial orders and imperial academic fields on Asia in wartime and postwar 
Japan. The Previous works I mentioned are key stones for future researches regarding 
empire, mobilisation and intellectuals in Japan and Asia. 
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